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Reviewed by Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh 
 
This book is a must-have for philosophers of psychology, philosophers of biology, 
philosophers of the social sciences, and, more generally, anybody who is interested in the 
evolution of mind and behavior. The anthropologists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson 
have collected twenty of their most important articles written between 1987 and 2003. 
This collection is an excellent initiative, since these articles were scattered in sometimes 
hard-to-find journals or books across a large number of disciplines. These articles extend 
the ground-breaking theory of culture developed in their 1985 book, Culture and the 
Evolutionary Process. Interested readers should also consult their more popular 2004 
book, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. 
 
An original and compelling picture of the evolution of our species emerges from the 
book. Culture is at the heart of this picture. Boyd and Richerson characterize culture in 
ideational terms: For the most part, culture consists in the beliefs, values, norms, desires, 
techniques, and so on, that people acquire by social learning. Cultural transmission is not 
always faithful: Cultural items may be modified, for instance because of transmission 
inaccuracies or individual innovation. Moreover, not all cultural variants are equal: Boyd 
and Richerson emphasize various biases that favor the transmission of some cultural 
variants over others, particularly conformism, compliance to social norms, and imitation 
of prestigious individuals. Culture is thus a system of inheritance with modification, in 
which various forces (conformism, etc.) determine which cultural items are preferentially 
transmitted in a population. In other words, culture evolves. 
 
The general outline should be familiar enough, given the (already fading) popular success 
of memetics. But, despite a family resemblance, Boyd and Richerson’s framework has 
little to do with memetics. First, and most important, memetics has usually very little 
explanatory power. Too often, memetic explanations boil down to the uninformative 
claim that a given meme has spread in a population because it has reproduced itself 
successfully. The essential issue, What makes it the case that a cultural variant is 
preferentially transmitted?, is often dodged, or, when it is not, is addressed with sheer 
speculation. On the contrary, Boyd and Richerson ground their views in the 
contemporary psychology (but see some reservations below). Mathematical models that 
describe the spread of cultural items in a population are based on specific hypotheses 
about people’s minds, primarily, the nature of human social learning. To capture the 
population-level properties of cultural evolution, Boyd and Richerson have adapted the 
mathematical models of population genetics. They have developed an exciting toolkit of 
mathematical models that describe various aspects of cultural evolution.  
 
Second, Boyd and Richerson’s theory of culture is the cornerstone of their view of the 
evolution of the human species. According to them, culture is an adaptation, like other 
forms of social learning in non human animal species: It enables humans to acquire 
adaptive behavior in variable environments. But while the scope of social learning is 
rather restricted in other species, culture pervades human behavior as well as the human 
mind (Nisbett et al. 2001). Culture differs also from non human social learning in that it 
is cumulative: Only humans acquire socially some beliefs, values, and so on, that they 
could not acquire by themselves.   
 
Moreover, Boyd and Richerson make a decisive case that the evolution of the most 
distinctive aspects of our species cannot be explained if one neglects culture. Culture sent 
our species on a unique evolutionary path. To put it differently, culture created some 
social environments, in which specific adaptations were selected for by natural selection. 
This notion of gene-culture co-evolution may be the most important aspect of their work. 
It distinguishes markedly their work from other evolutionary approaches. Boyd and 
Richerson’s models suggest that gene-culture co-evolution could explain, for instance, 
our propensity to collaborate in large groups of unrelated individuals, which singles out 
humans in the natural world, as well as our propensity to create social groups that are 
symbolically marked.  
 
Fascinating as it is, this general picture of culture and of the evolution of our species 
should not obscure the independent interest of the articles collected in this book. These 
articles are divided into five sections, introduced by short, but useful forewords. The first 
section, entitled “The evolution of social learning,” focuses on the evolution of cultural 
transmission. The articles in this section examine the adaptive nature of social learning 
and investigate why cumulative cultural transmission evolved only in the human species. 
The second section, entitled “Ethnic groups and markers,” describes two models of the 
cultural evolution of ethnically marked groups. The third section, “Human cooperation, 
reciprocity, and group selection,” focuses on the evolution of cooperation in large groups. 
It contains some of the best-known and most original contributions of Boyd and 
Richerson. They show that it is unlikely that reciprocity explains human large-scale 
cooperation. Cultural transmission may be the key to the puzzle. Cooperative behavior 
could have evolved culturally due to conformism, together with punishment and cultural 
group selection. Section 4, “Archaeology and culture history,” brings Boyd and 
Richerson’s theory to bear on historical and archaeological issues. The last section, 
“Links to other disciplines,” collects some methodological articles. A few articles may be 
hard to follow by those readers who are not as savvy in population genetics as our two 
authors. However, in most articles, the mathematical parts are in appendices. More 
important, Boyd and Richerson do a very good job of explaining the rationale and main 
aspects of their mathematical models.  
 
There is much of interest for philosophers. For the sake of space, I pick here a handful of 
topics. Philosophers interested in the methodology of the social sciences will pay 
particular attention to Boyd and Richerson’s methodological views. Noticeably, our two 
authors reject many standard dichotomies in the social sciences. 
- Methodological individualism versus methodological holism. Boyd and Richerson 
argue that population-level models bridge the gap between these two views: 
Models of cultural evolution explore the long-term, population-level 
consequences of hypotheses about people’s psychology. 
- Biological versus cultural explanations of social phenomena. This dichotomy is 
inconsistent with the gene-culture co-evolution approach. 
- Functionalism. Social scientists as well as philosophers have regularly questioned 
the methodological status of functionalist interpretations of social or cultural 
entities (taboos, norms, etc.). Boyd and Richerson provide an interesting 
perspective on this issue. On the basis of theoretical models and empirical 
evidence, they argue that group selection on culturally stabilized group 
differences is an important force in cultural evolution. They claim that some 
social properties—viz. those whose cultural evolution takes centuries—can be 
explained functionally. 
Many topics will hold the attention of philosophers of biology, for instance:  
- Human nature. Since at least the sociobiology controversy, philosophers of 
biology have discussed, usually critically, the value of this notion. Boyd and 
Richerson show that arguments that pit culture against the notion of human nature 
are unsound.  
- Models in evolutionary theory. Although Boyd and Richerson have developed 
many mathematical models, they endorse a deflationary view of the role of 
models in evolutionary biology. Models are essentially used to derive rigorously 
the consequences of hypotheses. This should also interest philosophers of science 
in general, given the recent work on the notion of model (e.g., Downes 1992).  
Finally, philosophers of psychology will be interested in how psychology can be brought 
in contact with evolutionary theory and anthropology. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Machery and Faucher, forthcoming), Boyd and Richerson’s framework may be the key 
to solve the integration challenge—i.e., how to integrate the divergent and, in some 
respects, inconsistent approaches to human behavior in the contemporary social sciences 
—particularly, an evolutionary-minded psychology and a culturally-oriented 
anthropology. 
 
It should be clear from the review so far that I truly admire Boyd and Richerson’s work. 
It is the most sophisticated attempt to bring the study of human behavior and psychology 
within an evolutionary framework. They have not underplayed the particularities of the 
human species. Instead of bringing human behavior and psychology into the procrustean 
bed of sociobiological models of social behavior, they have developed sui generis models 
of gene-culture co-evolution. Moreover, this approach could be the overarching 
framework for integrating the increasingly scattered social sciences—primarily, 
sociology, anthropology, cultural, cognitive and social psychology. 
 
However, a review would not be a review without at least some qualms. Boyd and 
Richerson refer regularly to experimental psychology in order to justify the hypotheses 
built in their models. This is certainly laudable. The philosopher of psychology may 
however feel that our two authors are to some extent out of touch with the most 
successful works in recent cognitive and developmental psychology (Carey, Spelke, 
Haidt, to cite a few psychologists). Moreover, their models lean heavily on the study of 
social learning made in the seventies. The psychological study of social learning should 
be certainly pushed forward. To be fair, social psychologists themselves have often 
neglected social learning in the eighties and nineties. Noticeably, some psychologists and 
experimentally-minded anthropologists, including Richerson and colleagues, have 
recently brought the experimental method to bear on the study of cultural transmission 
(Kameda & Nakanishi 2002; Baum et al. 2004).  
 
Second, most of the articles collected in this book are theoretical: They provide models to 
explain a limited number of puzzling phenomena. Certainly, Boyd and Richerson’s 
framework would be considerably strengthened if it were more strongly connected to 
empirical research.  In fact, several of the collected articles make rather specific empirical 
predictions. For instance, chapters 6 and 7 on the evolution of ethnic markers predict that 
the emphasis on ethnic markers should be stronger at the border between two cultural 
groups. The first two misgivings are related. Boyd and Richerson’s framework can be the 
umbrella for a wealth of interdisciplinary empirical projects, particularly, but not 
exclusively, in psychology and anthropology. Their research ought to be extended in 
more empirical directions.  
 
Boyd and Richerson’s theory of cultural evolution is a key element in explaining various 
puzzling features of human nature, for instance large-scale cooperation. However, it is 
less clear how it could be used by anthropologists and cultural psychologists interested in 
understanding specific cultural phenomena in specific cultures—for instance, why a 
holistic cognitive style is prevalent in Eastern cultures (Nisbett et al. 2001). It would 
certainly be a shortcoming for Boyd and Richerson’s theory of culture if it were mostly 
useless for such a purpose. Recent work suggests however that their theory can shed a lot 
of light on specific historical phenomena (e.g., Henrich 2004; McElreath 2004—see also 
Chapter 15, where Boyd and Richerson discuss a related issue).  
 
I conclude with three questions to Boyd and Richerson’s theory of culture. 
- Cultural transmission is affected by various biases. Boyd and Richerson 
emphasize particularly conformism, norm obedience, and the imitation of 
prestigious individuals, which are known as “context biases.” Others like Sperber 
(1996) have emphasized the importance of our cognitive systems (called 
“attractors”) in cultural evolution: Some cultural variants spread because they fit 
our cognitive systems. For instance, meat taboos spread because meat is an 
evolved trigger of our disgust reaction (Fessler and Navarrete 2003). Although 
Boyd and Richerson do not deny the importance of attractors, they pay little 
attention to them. The relative importance of both types of biases in different 
domains is an important empirical issue (see Henrich and Boyd 2002). 
- Boyd and Richerson’s theory of cultural transmission is strikingly domain-
general. It seems tailored to account for the spread of technologies and, maybe, of 
social norms. However, it is unclear whether it does a good job in all domains. 
For instance, it is unclear whether it can account for the cultural evolution of our 
folk mathematical knowledge. Cultural transmission could take different forms in 
different domains. More empirical work is needed to decide this issue (for some 
suggestions, see McElreath 2004). 
- The evolutionary consequences of culture distinguish culture from other kinds of 
phenotypic plasticity (individual learning etc.). Although Boyd and Richerson 
don’t say that much, they seem to believe that culture is the only type of plasticity 
that shapes the course of evolution. On the contrary, proponents of evo-devo 
argue that this is the case of all forms of plasticity. If evo-devo is correct, gene-
culture co-evolution could be a particular case of a more general phenomenon. 
 To conclude briefly, philosophers interested in anthropology, psychology, evolutionary 
theory, to name a few disciplines, will be amply rewarded for reading this dense 
collection of articles. Together with their two other books (1985, 2004), this collection is 
an important landmark in the social sciences.  
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